I am looking for a social welfare function which satisfies "unrestricted domain", "Pareto efficiency", and "independence of irrelevant alternatives". One of the known proofs for Arrow's theorem argues by assuming the existance of such a function and follows that a dictator must exist. I wanted to execute this "construction" on an explicit function but noticed that I cannot actually find any online.
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2Just pick a dictator; that gives you your function. – Brian M. Scott Jan 10 '15 at 20:54
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True. I did not realize that dictatorship implies the other properties. – Andreas T Jan 10 '15 at 21:08
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I have always liked the idea of delegated dictatorship, so you have a hierarchy of individuals with respective preferences meeting the standard requirements $\succeq_1,\succeq_2,\succeq_3, \dots$ such that
- $A \succ B\qquad$ if $A \succeq_1 B$, and $B \not \succeq_1 A$ (the dictator)
- $A \succ B\qquad$ if $A\succeq_i B$ for $i \le n$, and $B\succeq_i A$ for $i \lt n$, and $B \not \succeq_n A$ (delegated dictator)
- $A \asymp B\qquad$ if $A\succeq_i B$ and $B\succeq_i A$ for all $i$ (total indifference)
It is rather like ordering the complex numbers by their real parts, but if those are equal then by their imaginary parts.
Henry
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Thanks, this is an interesting approach. However, the version of the theorem I am working with is for strict linear orders (asymmetric), so this system would not work. – Andreas T Jan 11 '15 at 00:25