I am looking for a semantic for deduction theorem in modal logic,I wanna find a semantic way to prove this theorem,but I wasn't successful.tnx for your help
2 Answers
You can see :
- Raul Hakli & Sara Negri, Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic (2010), for a detailed discussion of the Deduction Th in modal logic.
See in particular page 6 for a discussion about an :
argument for the failure of the deduction theorem [...] based on Kripke semantics.
The "issue" with the proof of the Deduction Th for modal logic is the "interaction" with the Necessitation rule : NEC.
If we consider the following proof from premises :
1) $P$ --- premise
2) $\square P$ --- from 1) by NEC
we have a proof of $\square P$ from $P$, i.e. $P \vdash \square P$.
Thus, with an "unrestricted" Deduction Th we can derive the invalid :
$P \to \square P$.
See Sider's book suggested in Bruno's answer below, for the restrictions to be applied in order to prove the Deduction Th in some systems of modal logic.
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tnx,but I can't undrestand this sentence in page 6 "In more general terms, the above statement is actually asking more than the deduction theorem, as it hides an inference from admissibility to derivability." I wasn't able to find the reason of relation between this sentence and cut example. – fateme jl May 08 '15 at 13:45
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@fatima - regarding admissibility vs derivability of rules, see this post. In classical logic the two concepts coincide; not so in other logics, like the intuitionistic logic or modal system. See there for references. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA May 09 '15 at 15:53
For a more basic account of the subject you can refer to:
- Theodore Sider, Logic for Philosophy, Ch. 6, p. 178
The author provides simple proofs of soundness, completeness and the deduction theorem for a variety of modal systems.
However, the book does not cover strong soundness and strong completeness though, since the notion of proof from a set involves more complicated issues with the presence of the necessitation rule (see Mauro's answer above).
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