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Considering an arbitrary model, is law of the excluded middle the weakest axiom needed to make the contrapositive of a statement logically equivalent to the statement? I've seen and done the first order logic proof of it, but what about other kinds of logics like multiple valued logic. I'm not sure whether one needs a stronger or weaker axiom to make use of the contrapositive.

aaron
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  • $p \rightarrow q = \neg p \vee q$ and $\neg q \rightarrow \neg p = q \vee \neg p$--so they are always equivalent. I'm not sure what your question is. – Jared May 31 '15 at 06:02
  • Suppose when one was happy they always smiled and never smiled when they were sad. Then the sentence "if I'm smiling then I'm happy" wouldn't need to be logically equivalent to "if I'm not happy then I'm not smiling" because it isn't necessarily true in the instance where you could be neutral feeling but still smiling. However if we stipulate that there is no third feeling like neutral that satisfies "not happy" and also "happy" (which could happen in multiple valued logic), then the sentences become equivalent. I'm wondering if there's any weaker way to do this in general. – aaron May 31 '15 at 06:13
  • The statement "If I'm smiling then I'm happy" is equivalent to "If I'm not happy then I'm not smiling" because if you were smiling then you'd be happy according to the original statement. You confused things by explaining them one way and then writing a non-equivalent "expression". If you meant that when one is happy they always smile then it should have been: "If I'm happy then I smile" and "If I'm not smiling then I'm not happy". Now you can absolutely smile when you are neutral because neutral is not happy and therefore you could smile or not smile and satisfy both expressions. – Jared May 31 '15 at 06:19
  • If neutral was in the extension of happy and not happy and one considered, I think, a multi valued model with positive semantics then being neutral and smiling would satisfy "if I'm smiling then I'm happy" but it would not satisfy "if I'm not happy then I'm not smiling" since it would be true that you are not happy, since neutral is in the extension of not happy, but it would be false that you're not smiling. – aaron May 31 '15 at 06:25
  • The contrapositive still works, but in your case the negation of "happy" is "neutral" or "unhappy" so it shouldn't have been: "If I'm not smiling then I'm unhappy", it should have been "If I'm not smiling then I'm unhappy or neutral. – Jared May 31 '15 at 06:40
  • If on the other hand you mean to define a set of neutral people who are both neutral and happy and neutral and unhappy (which intersects both the happy and unhappy sets of people), then this is a different thing altogether. The proposition "unhappy" is still not incorrect. What's incorrect is your assertion that this violates the idea that you can be neutral and smiling. You assume that "unhappy" means "not neutral"--but it doesn't. If you take out all of the "unhappy" people in the neutral set you are left with all of the happy neutral people (who may or may not smile). – Jared May 31 '15 at 06:47
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    @Jared You need to learn about intuitionistic logic. – Zhen Lin May 31 '15 at 08:37
  • @ZhenLin Then Wolfram appears to answer the OP's question. Two quotes of note: 1) "Intuitionistic logic is a part of classical logic, that is, all formulas provable in intuitionistic logic are also provable in classical logic." and 2) "Although, even some basic theorems of classical logic do not hold in intuitionistic logic. Of course, the law of the excluded middle: $F \vee \neg F$ " does not hold in intuitionistic propositional logic." – Jared May 31 '15 at 09:19
  • @Jared It does seem like the OP is talking about intuitionistic logic (and extensions of it), but I don't see how the wolfram.com page answers his question. – Trevor Wilson May 31 '15 at 16:03
  • The OP asks explicitly about multi-valued logics, and intuitionistic logic is not one, by a result of Gödel. (Glivenko proved that it's not 3-valued; Gödel proved it's not $n$-valued for any finite $n$.) –  May 31 '15 at 16:25
  • @StevenTaschuk I assume that comment is directed at me. The OP asks about "other kinds of logics like multiple valued logic" (emphasis added). I don't think the question is precise enough to rule out the answer I gave, but it would definitely be interesting to see an answer about multiple-valued logics also. – Trevor Wilson May 31 '15 at 16:55
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    @TrevorWilson : I think your answer is good; the fact that contraposition and excluded middle are equivalent relative to intuitionistic logic is interesting, relevant to the OP's question, and well explained in your answer. I only wish to object to the assumption that when someone talks about omitting excluded middle, they're talking about intuitionistic logic (especially when they explicitly refer to other kinds of logic as well). I apologize for my brusqueness in making the objection. I've added an answer about two standard multi-valued logics to complement yours. –  May 31 '15 at 17:22

2 Answers2

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When you talk about logic without the law of excluded middle, I assume that you are talking about intuitionistic logic. In this context, the axiom $(p \to q) \leftrightarrow (\neg q \to \neg p)$ is equivalent to the law of excluded middle, so the answer to your question is yes.

To see this, note that $(p \to q) \to (\neg q \to \neg p)$ is a theorem of intuitionistic logic, so the useful direction will be $(\neg q \to \neg p) \to (p \to q)$. Plugging in $\neg \neg q$ for $p$, we get $(\neg q \to \neg\neg\neg q) \to (\neg \neg q \to q)$. Because $\neg q \to \neg\neg\neg q$ is a theorem of intuitionistic logic (and more generally so is $r \to \neg \neg r$) we get $\neg \neg q \to q$, the law of double negation elimination, which is well-known to be equivalent to the law of excluded middle.

You might be interested in reading about intermediate logics.

Trevor Wilson
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  • Wolfram disagrees about the Law of Excluded Middle: "A law in (2-valued) logic which states there is no third alternative to truth or falsehood. In other words, for any statement A, either A or not-A must be true and the other must be false. This law no longer holds in three-valued logic or fuzzy logic." – Jared Jun 01 '15 at 07:00
  • @Jared I don't see any disagreement. I'm not claiming that intuitionistic logic is the only logic without LEM. However, it is a commonly studied one. Also, there are natural axiomatizations of classical logic such that, if you remove LEM, you get an axiomatization of intuitionistic logic. So it does seem like a natural setting for the OP's question. – Trevor Wilson Jun 01 '15 at 15:21
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In the (strong) Kleene three-valued logic $K_3$, \begin{align*} p\to q &\vDash \neg q\to\neg p \\ \neg q\to\neg p &\vDash p\to q \\ &\not\vDash p\vee\neg p \end{align*} which strictly speaking is what you asked for. This is kind of cheating, though, since $K_3$ has no logical truths at all. For such a logic, maybe a more satisfying candidate for the title "law of the excluded middle" is something like $$ p\to q,\neg p\to q\vDash q $$ which $K_3$ validates (even though a tertium is certainly datur!).


In the Łukasiewicz three-valued logic $\textit{Ł}_3$, though, \begin{align*} p\to q &\vDash \neg q\to\neg p \\ \neg q\to\neg p &\vDash p\to q \\ &\not\vDash p\vee\neg p \\ p\to q,\neg p\to q &\not\vDash q \end{align*} (The key difference being that $i\to i = 1$ in $\textit{Ł}_3$, but $i\to i = i$ in $K_3$.) According to the SEP, Wajsberg (partially) axiomatized $\textit{Ł}_3$ thus:

  1. $p\to (q\to p)$
  2. $(p\to q)\to (q\to r)\to (p\to r)$
  3. $(\neg p\to\neg q)\to (q\to p)$
  4. $((p\to\neg p)\to p)\to p$

Half of contraposition is right there as (3); I guess the other half arises by taking $r=\bot$ in (2). (I suppose $\bot$ can be defined as $\neg(p\to p)$.) So it seems that, no, excluded middle is stronger in this context than contraposition.


I think I computed the truth tables correctly, but I'd recommend that you check them yourself. My computations are not completely reliable.

  • By the way, @aaron , it seems that when you say "first-order logic", you mean first-order classical logic. Is this the normal terminology in your area? (I ask because in this kind of context I'd always specify, and I think I might have misunderstood a question here a few days ago because I saw "first-order logic" and didn't think it implied "classical".) –  May 31 '15 at 17:29
  • That's the way I learned it in undergrad. Your answer is really interesting, thank you! – aaron Jun 01 '15 at 12:12