Consider the following set: $X=\{0\}$ if the Riemann hypothesis is true, and $X=\{1\}$ otherwise. Then:
I can write down a pair of Turing machines $T_0$ and $T_1$, and prove that either $T_0$ computes $X$ or $T_1$ computes $X$.
Of course, I can't tell which machine computes $X$ . . .
. . . but I don't care: there is one, so $X$ is recursive.
If you understand this example, the case of arbitrary finite sets is no different: we can find a computable sequence of Turing machines $T_{e_i}$ ($i\in\omega$) such that $T_{e_i}$ computes $F_i$, where $\{F_i: i\in\omega\}$ is some enumeration of all finite sets. Then if we know $X$ is finite, we know some $T_{e_i}$ computes $X$. We don't know which . . . but we don't care.
Actually, "we don't care" is putting it a bit strongly. We absolutely do care when we're not looking at just one finite set in a vacuum. For instance, let $K_n=K\cap\{0, . . . , n\}$. Then each $K_n$ is computable, but the $K_n$s are not uniformly computable - there is no computable $f$ such that $T_{f(n)}$ is a Turing machine computing $K_n$. Uniformity issues are indeed a Big Deal. But, if you're just asking whether an individual finite set is computable or not, they don't come up.