Source: p 224, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (1 ed, 1999) by Simon Blackburn.
I capitalised miniscules, which the author uses for variables.
I pursue only intuition; please do not answer with formal proofs. Discussing Bayes's Theorem
( $
\Pr(H|E)=\frac{\Pr(E|H)\Pr(H)}{\Pr(E)}
$ ), the author abbreviates 'evidence' to E and 'hypothesis' to H.
$\qquad$ For interest, it is worth mentioning that there are quite orthodox methods of statistical inference that try to bypass Bayesian ideas. Much scientific research contents itself with ascertaining that some result would only occur by chance some small percentage of the time (less that 5 per cent, or less than 1 per cent, for example). But it THEN infers that probably the result is not due to chance -- that is, there is a significant causal factor or correlation of some kind involved. This prevalent reasoning is actually highly doubtful, and Bayes shows why.
$\color{green}{[1.]}$ If the antecedent probability that a result is due to anything else than chance is very, very low, then even enormously improbable results will not overturn it. [...]
[I omit the author's example using Scrabble of which I know little.]$\color{green}{[2.]}$ In this setup ANY result is going to be very improbable, and we should not be able to infer back to say that anything other than chance is responsible for it.
I do not understand $\color{green}{1 \; \& \; 2.}$ About which probabilities is the author cautioning? What exactly is the problem, as (scientists would know that) any probability can be caused 100% by chance?