The three pinciples : bivalence, excluded middle and non-contradiction are inextricably glued together in the semantics of classical logic.
As explained by other answers, when we leave that semantics, we can develop different logics - with their own semantics - where the logical laws formalizing the above principles may hold or not (separately).
To say that the semantics of classical logic is bivalent is to assume a "world" with exactly two truth-vales : $\text {True}$ and $\text {False}$, and to assume that the process of "semantical evaluation" of a sentence $p$ always comes to an end, producing as output one of them.
In addition, the said semantics assumes that the role of negation is to swap the truth-value of a sentence.
Thus, we can express bivalence this way :
(i) for every sentence $p$ and every valuation $v$ : $v(p) \in \{ \text T, \text F \}$.
(ii) for every sentence $p$ and every valuation $v$ : $v(\lnot p)= \text { T iff } v(p)= \text F$.
From them, excluded middle follows :
(LEM) for every $p$ and every $v : \text { either } v(p)= \text { T or } v(\lnot p)= \text T$, from which : $v(p \text { or } \lnot p)=\text T$, for every valuation.
At this point, the inclusive-exclusive uses of "or" has been by-passed, because - by (ii) above - we cannot have both disjuncts with the same truth-value.
In the same way, we have non-contradiction. From (ii) again, we have :
(LNC) for no $v : v(p)=v(\lnot p)$, from which : $v(p \text { and } \lnot p)= \text F$, for every valuation.
Up to now, we have used the "operations" of negation, disjunction and conjunction in an intuitive way, assuming very limited features of them.
If we formalize the above operations with logical connectives (defined through thier truth tables), De Morgan's laws easily follow :
$v(\lnot (p \land q)) = \text { T iff } v(p \land q) = \text F$. But this holds exactly when at least one of $p,q$ is evaluated to $\text F$, i.e. when at least one of $\lnot p,\lnot q$ is evaluated to $\text T$. And this amounts to $v(\lnot p \lor \lnot q) = \text T$.
On Non-contradiction, see Aristotle, Met, Book IV ($\Gamma$), 1005b34-on :
There are some who, as we have said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be. [...] But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.
it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration.
First then this at least is obviously true, that the word ‘be’ or ‘not be’ has a definite meaning, so that not everything will be so and not so.
If, however, they [meanings] were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; but if this is possible, one name might be assigned to
this thing. Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the name has a meaning and has one meaning; it is impossible, then, that being a man should mean precisely not being a man [emphasis addwed].