Löb's Theorem says that,
If certain conditions hold for the theory $T$, then if $T \vdash Prov(\overline{\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner}) \to \varphi$, then $T \vdash \varphi$.
(Here $\overline{\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner}$ is $T$'s formal numeral for $\varphi$'s Gödel number under some given coding scheme: and $Prov$ is a 'provability predicate' suitably expressing the property of numbering a $T$-theorem in that scheme. Details in any textbook!)
Apply this to a Henkin sentence $H$ which is a fixed point for the provability predicate, i.e.
$T \vdash H \equiv Prov(\overline{\ulcorner H\urcorner})$
(so $H$ sort-of-says "I am provable"), and it is immediate that
$T \vdash H$.
Now: suppose (just suppose!) we have a pair of sentences $P, Q$ such that
$T \vdash P \equiv Prov(\overline{\ulcorner (P \land Q) \urcorner})$
$T \vdash Q \equiv Prov(\overline{\ulcorner (P \land Q) \urcorner})$.
So $P$ sort-of-says "$P \land Q$ is provable" and likewise for $Q$. Then trivially, we'd also have
$T \vdash (P \land Q) \equiv Prov(\overline{\ulcorner (P \land Q) \urcorner})$.
Then, by Löb's Theorem again, we'd have
$T \vdash (P \land Q)$, and hence $ T \vdash P$ and $T \vdash Q$.
But there is no novel interest in this as far as I can see.