Bivalence states that statements without free variables are either true or false, not both.
On Wikipedia, there is a demonstration of the principle of explosion:
We know that "Not all lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to be true.
We know that "All lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to be true.
Therefore, the two-part statement "All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true, since the first part is true.
However, since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow" (as this has been assumed), the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.
In particular, step 3 treats the statement "All lemons are yellow" as being true, and step 4 treats it as being false.
So I wonder if a statement could be both true and false within an argument involving contradiction (like above)?
(Please note that I am confining the considerations within the argument that involves contradiction. I understand that if we are in a consistent system, then each statement should have only one truth value with respect to some specific interpretation; and I understand that, in a consistent system with the interpretation, if some statement implies contradiction then this statement is exactly false and cannot be true. But I find that it seems to have an inevitable need for treating some statement as being both true and false when trying to conduct the implication of "false implies anything" like above. I would like to be clarified whether if such "temporary misuse" of bivalence is allowed when conducting the implication, e.g. when conducting proof by contradiction before we arrive at the contradiction, or if there is some other better explanation on how bivalence is still hold within the arguments like above)