I have some questions about under what conditions a set of truth assignments is the model of some set of sentences.
To be more precise, suppose I'm dealing with only propositional logic. Let $K$ be a set of truth assignments, i.e. those maps assigning truth values to propositional variables.
For any set $\Sigma$ of sentences, let $Mod(\Sigma):=\{v:v\ \mbox{is a truth assignment and v satisfies $\Sigma$}\}$.
Definition. Let $K$ be a set of truth assignments. Call $K$ definable if $K=Mod(\Sigma)$ for some set $\Sigma$ of sentences; if such $\Sigma$ can be chosen finite (or equivalently, containing a single sentence), then $K$ is finitely definable.
I can prove that, in a language with only finitely many propositional variables, any set of truth assignments is definable. Since in such language there are only finitely many truth assignments, what I proved can be rephrased as: any finite set of truth assignments is definable. Now my questions are:
- In a language with denumerably many propositional variables, there are continuum many truth assignments. Does what I proved still hold in this case? Is any set of truth assignments, or any finite set of truth assignments, definable? Or finitely definable?
- Is there a criterion for a set of truth assignments to be definable or finitely definable in a general setting? What would happen if we work in a language with uncountably many propositional variables?
Thank you in advance for anyone who might help me about this.