I try to decipher Löb's theorem by getting rid of some of the material implications for something more intuitive and in using classical substitutions for connectives on both levels. I came up with the following
$$([\text{PA} \vdash Bew(\# P)] \rightarrow P)\implies[\text{PA} \vdash P]$$
$$\neg([\text{PA} \vdash Bew(\# P)] \land \neg P)\implies[\text{PA} \vdash P]$$
$$\text{not}\ [\text{PA} \vdash P]\implies \text{not}\ \neg ([\text{PA} \vdash Bew(\# P)] \land \neg P)$$
(Here in the first line I replace "from A follows B" by "it can't be that A, while not B" and in the second line I replace "from A follows B" by "from not B follows not A".)
Now say we consider any false sentence $P$ and assume that $\text{PA}$ can't prove it (is sound w.r.t. to $P$). Then, if the two (arguably different) $not$s do cancel, it would follow that $\text{PA} \vdash Bew(\# P)) \land \neg P$. By assumption the second term $\neg P$ is true indeed, and hence I'm left with $\text{PA}$ having a proof $Bew(\# P)$ of the false statement $P$.
What is the issue with the above deduction? I understand if dropping "$\text{not}\ \neg$" might not be okay, but then I'm still somewhat surprised by the claim which results. Also, do you guys have a formulation of the theorem with a little less implications?
I was also reading this comic on the Löb's theorem. But its sentences $s$ are written in Comic Sans, which I read as notation for $\neg s$.
edit: corrected brackets
$$[\text{PA} \vdash (Bew(\# P) \rightarrow P)]\implies[\text{PA} \vdash P]$$
$$[\text{PA} \vdash \neg(Bew(\# P) \land \neg P)]\implies[\text{PA} \vdash P]$$
$$\text{not}[\text{PA} \vdash P]\implies \text{not}[\text{PA} \vdash \neg(Bew(\# P) \land \neg P)]$$
(Still not sure what now assuming $\neg P$ plus $\text{not}[\text{PA} \vdash P]$ leads to.)