Tl;dr: axioms are properties, but not every property is an axiom(of a given theory).
In mathematics, when we speak of "axioms", we typically mean the defining properties of some concept.
For example, associativity of addition is not just a property of a vector space: it is a necessary condition for something to be a vector space in the first place; if you have a structure whose "addition" is not associative, this structure is not a vector space. In contrast, being two-dimensional or having more than 17 elements are properties that some vector spaces have, while others don't.
This means that if you give me a vector space, I can take for granted that the addition is associative (without justification, as you say), but not that the vector space has more than 17 elements.
More specifically in logic, by axioms of a theory we usually mean a (hopefully somewhat concise) family of sentences from which all of the theory follows in a given deductive system. For example, we have the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory, but your vector space example also fits into this framework; there are also non-first order axiomatisations, such as the axioms of a complete ordered field.
In this context, it is not, strictly speaking, rigorous to call a given sentence an axiom of a theory, since a given theory can have many (even disjoint) axiomatisations, and any consequence of this theory can be taken as an axiom (every theory is axiomatised by itself in its entirety, after all). For example, if you give me a vector space, I can also take for granted that I have the exchange property for linear independence, which is not usually taken as an axiom, because I know that it is a theorem that follows from the axioms of a vector space.
Still, in practice, the axiom system is often implicitly fixed (sometimes up to minor variation which does not really matter), so we still say that something is "an axiom", meaning that it is one of the basic properties which we "take for granted", as opposed to a theorem.
(Sometimes there are multiple fundamentally different reasonable, equivalent axiomatisations. In this case, of course, we use adjectives.)