I found this proposition and don't see exactly as to why it is true and even more so, why the converse is false:
Proposition 1. The equivalence between the proposition $z \in D$ and the proposition $(\exists x \in D)x = z$ is provable from the definitory equations of the existential quantifier and of the equality relation. If $D = \{t_{1},t_{2},...t_{n}\}$, the sequent $z = t_{1} \vee z = t_{2} \vee z \vee ... z = t_{n} \vdash z \in D$ is provable from the definition of the additive disjunction $\vee$.
The converse sequent $z \in D \vdash z = t_{1} \vee z = t_{2} \vee ... z = t_{n}$ is not provable.
The author goes on to say: "We adopt the intuitionistic interpretation of disjunction. With respect to it, one can characterize a particular class of finite sets"
On the first part of the proposition, well I am not sure what the point is as if we take an element z in D, then we could just call this element x and hence this x = z. Is there something more to this? On the second part of Proposition 1 since $z = \text{ some } t \in D$ since t is in the set of axioms and $t = z$, then $t \vdash z$ as z is derivable from t.
For the converse if $z \in D$ then why wouldn't z = some $t \in D$? Is this because of the Incompleteness theorem? That perhaps there D as a set of axioms has some consequence which can not be proven by the set of axioms in D? Or perhaps I am way off here.
Any ideas?
Thanks,
Brian
Definition 1 – Relative0 Aug 08 '13 at 21:37