There are two players in this cooperative game. I will first describe the basic game and then the real problem.
Consider first that player 1 is to sample a single value from a standard normal distribution. Player 2 knows the distribution player 1 samples from. After player 1 has seen the value they have sampled they can send player 2 a single bit of information. That is a single indicator value. Player 1 and 2 have agreed beforehand what the indicator value will be indicating.
To start with, player 2's prior belief is that player 1 has sampled from a standard normal distribution (because that is what was agreed). After receiving the single bit of information, player 2 will have some posterior belief about the distribution of the sampled value. The goal of both players is to agree a strategy to minimize the variance of player 2's posterior belief on average.
For example, they could agree that player 1 will tell player 2 the sign of the sampled value. If player 1 samples a positive value then player 2's posterior belief will now be the half normal distribution with variance $1 - \frac{2}{\pi}$. The same variance would occur if player 1 had sampled a negative value
- Could they have chosen a different strategy which would have given a lower variance on average?
Now to the real problem. In the real version player 1 is to sample from some arbitrary continuous distribution with finite support. They can still confer to agree a strategy beforehand and player 2 still knows the distribution that player 1 will sample from.
- Can they do any better than agreeing that player 1 will send to player 2 an indicator that indicates if the sampled value is above the median or not?
Bounty question
If we constrain the support to be $[0, 1]$, what distribution gives the largest possible gap from the result you get from sending an indicator that optimally minimizes the variance of player 2's posterior belief and the variance of player 2's belief if they were simply informed whether the sampled value is above the median or not?