The continuum hypothesis (CH) states there does not exist $A \subset \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$ whose cardinality lies between $|\mathbb{N}|$ and $|\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})|$.
For each model of ZFC, CH is either true or false. In particular, for the "true model" of $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$, CH is either true or false.
It was shown ZFC neither proves nor disproves CH. This was done by showing there exists a model of ZFC where CH holds, and another model where CH fails. This seems partly like a defect of first order logic. In particular, first order logic is outrageously bad at specifying intended models (for us $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$), which leads to my question.
$\textbf{Question}$: Is there any hope of an extension of first order logic (which can accurately specify $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$ and omit unintended models) resolving the continuum hypothesis? For instance, one might wonder if the models Cohen and Godel made also work for $\mathscr{L}_{\omega_1 \omega}$ and $\mathscr{L}_Q$.
Extensions of first order logic tend not to be complete, so even if $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$ is accurately specified, it isn't given either CH or not CH is provable.