The "usual" way to define the negation : $\lnot$ is to introduce a propositional constant (or $0$-connective) : $\bot$.
See Dirk van Dalen, Logic and Structure (5th ed - 2013), page 30 :
As usual “$\lnot \varphi$” is used here as an abbreviation for “$\varphi \rightarrow \bot$”.
In this way, in classical logic, the semantics for $\lnot$ is "reduced to" that for $\rightarrow$ :
when $\varphi$ is true $\varphi \rightarrow \bot$ is $T \rightarrow F$, which is false,
and
when $\varphi$ is false $\varphi \rightarrow \bot$ is $F \rightarrow F$, which is true.
In intuitionistic logic the definition still holds.
What differ are the rules. In classical logic we have [see page 30] :
(RAA) $$\frac {\frac {[\lnot \varphi]} \bot } \varphi$$
which does not hold in the intuitionistic one.
The difference is due to the different semantics [see page 156] :
The primitive notion is here “$a$ proves $\varphi$”, where we understand by a proof a
construction. [...] :
$(→)$ : $a$ proves $\varphi → \psi$ iff $a$ is a construction that converts any proof $p$ of $\varphi$ into a proof $a(p)$ of $\psi$.
$(⊥)$ : no $a$ proves $\bot$.
Thus [page 157] :
The only rule that lacks constructive content is that of reductio ad absurdum (RAA). As we have seen [see page 36], an application of RAA yields $\lnot \lnot \varphi → \varphi$, but for $\lnot \lnot \varphi → \varphi$ to hold [in intuitionistic logic] informally we need a construction that transforms a proof of $\lnot \lnot \varphi$ into a proof of $\varphi$.
Now $a$ proves $\lnot \lnot \varphi$ if $a$ transforms each proof $b$ of $\lnot \varphi$ into a proof of $\bot$, i.e. there cannot be a proof $b$ of $\lnot \varphi$. $b$ itself should be a construction that transforms each proof $c$ of $\varphi$ into a proof of $\bot$.
So we know that there cannot be a construction that turns a proof of $\varphi$ into a
proof of $\bot$, but that is a long way from the required proof of $\varphi$ !