Let $p$ be the proportion of the town's voter's that the bloc (which I'll call P) has.
Suppose that the bloc gives its supporters the following instructions:
- Cast one vote each for candidates A, B, C, and D.
- If you're a woman, cast extra votes for A and B. If you're a man, cast extra votes for C and D. (The choice of how to assign the two A/B and C/D sub-blocks is arbitrary, but should be as close to a 50/50 split as possible.
Then each of the bloc's four candidates gets an average of $\frac{3p}{2}$ of the total vote.
Now, suppose that a competing bloc Q with proportion $q$ of the electorate decides to nominate $n$ candidates, with a similar scheme to divide votes equally between candidates. Each of their candidates gets $\frac{6q}{n}$ of the vote.
For this competing block to have their candidates get more votes than the original bloc's $\frac{6q}{n} > \frac{3p}{2}$. Equivalently, this restricts them to nominating $n < \frac{4q}{p}$ candidates. But they must also nominate a minimum of 3 candidates, or the original bloc would still win 4 seats by default. So, for Q's strategic nomination to work, they must have $3 \le n < \frac{4q}{p}$, which requires $q > \frac{3}{4}p$. Assuming a two-party system where $p + q = 1$, this means $q > \frac{3}{7}$.
So bloc P has the ability to win all four seats only if they have at least $\frac{4}7$ (57.1%) of the voters. Otherwise, a competing faction can use the same split-your-votes-equally strategy to win at least 3 seats.