For questions regarding the mathematical analysis of voting systems and behavior. Examples include the median voter theorem or the Condorcet jury theorems.
Questions tagged [voting-theory]
141 questions
16
votes
2 answers
Honest vs. Dishonest Voting: does it matter?
Let's say I have a website where people can rate movies on a scale of 0-10. We say people vote honestly when the rating they give to a movie is what they actually think. People vote dishonestly when they try to get the website's rating to be closer…
jamaicanworm
- 4,494
8
votes
4 answers
Electoral college
"Recall that" [if one can pardon that expression] the Constitution of the United States provides that
(1) the president is elected by a college of electors, and that
(2) there are as many of those from each state as there are senators and…
5
votes
1 answer
Fair Rank Voting When Some Members Do Not Vote
I am currently trying to work out a problem with a voting system for a local club. Competitions are held frequently and the current system works as such:
Everbody who enters the competition gets to vote
Everybody gets 3 votes; first second and…
Jacob Regan
- 91
- 2
4
votes
1 answer
Borda Count vs Average Ranking
Recently, I was explaining to my high school class what the Borda Count was. We had taken a class survey on something and everyone ranked their choices in order of preference. I calculated the Borda Count scores and showed the class the official…
ruferd
- 534
3
votes
0 answers
Ranking a set – is pair-based voting a good idea?
I have a set which I want to rank based on which entry people favor the most.
The set consists of too many entries for the voters to sort the entire list, and since the set contains some mainstream favorites I don't want voters to pick the top…
ehm
- 131
3
votes
1 answer
If the real preferences of a population include a condorcet winner, does that mean that any condorcet method is invulnerable to manipulation?
This is probably true, and easy to prove, but I am not coming up with a proof...
Say we have a population, with each individual casting a ballot of preferences
Individual1 might say, eg, A > B > C, meaning that individual1 prefers candidate A to B,…
josinalvo
- 1,448
3
votes
1 answer
Yes/No voting alternatives
I have found many ressources on alternative voting system for multiple candidates (highest median, maximal lotteries, etc..), but very few on a "two candidates situation", or a yes/no situation.
With two candidates, it's clear that cardinal voting…
Albert Beton
- 353
- 1
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3
votes
0 answers
Hamilton's paradox
We have the rule:
We compare parties A and B in two different elections. If it happens that A wins votes and B loses votes, it cannot happen that A loses a seat and B wins a seat.
Concretely, I have to prove that Hamilton's method does not meet…
EvaMGG
- 486
3
votes
1 answer
When is there always a Condorcet winner?
I found the following in a book about voting systems, and it is claiming that in this particular situation there always is a Condorcet winner: "Suppose there is an odd number of voters and all voter's preferences are single peaked (ie if we identify…
Wolfgangg
- 189
2
votes
0 answers
Help me find a way of sorting pairs of candidates for ranked pairs voting when not all voters rank all candidates
(Background: For ranked pairs voting when all voters rank all candidates, pairs of candidates $(A, B)$ are sorted by the margin of victory between the two candidates (that is, if $x$ voters prefer $A$ to $B$, and $y$ voters prefer $B$ to $A$, then…
2
votes
0 answers
What is the best voting system where all voters are omniscient and perfectly logical?
We can model each voter's preferences by assigning a real number, called a score, on the interval $[0, 1]$ to each candidate. The goal of each voter is to elect a candidate with the maximal score according to their own preferences.
Voters are…
Kainoa B
- 171
2
votes
2 answers
Voting Systems without tactical voting
Which voting systems do not have tactical voting? Specifically, expressing your true preference on a ballot will not result in a less favorably outcome.
I'm looking at both multiple-winner and single-winner.
One that I know off already is random…
Christopher King
- 10,365
1
vote
0 answers
How do I formally prove this single transferable vote rule is independent of covered alternatives when electing a single winner?
I invented a new STV rule that appears to be independent of covered alternatives for a single-winner case (IRV). I am not sure what basic approach to use to formally prove this is independent of covered alternatives (a new criterion as far as I…
John Moser
- 193
- 4
1
vote
1 answer
Can strategy be used to win a majority in an election which uses cumulative voting? This is a voting theory question.
Scenario:
A town is having an election for its Board of Trustees. There are six seats on the Board. A bloc of voters wants to win a majority, or four seats.
The election uses cumulative voting, an election method that permits a voter to cast…
naiose
- 23
1
vote
1 answer
How to use the hamilton method (largest remainder method) when the maximum amount of seats is limited
I hope this is the right place to ask even though the math behind it is quite easy, i have trouble with the application of the hamilton method on my problem.
The hamilton method/hare niemeyer method describes a system how to allocate seats in a…
Inselino
- 113